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An application of quantum communications is the transmission of qubits to create shared sym-
metric encryption keys in a process called Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). Contrary to public-
private key encryption, symmetric encryption is safe from (quantum) computing attacks, i.e. it
provides forward security and is thus attractive for secure communications. In this paper we argue
that for free-space quantum communications, especially with satellites, if one assumes that man-in-
the-middle attacks can be detected by classical channel monitoring techniques, simplified quantum
communications protocols and hardware systems can be implemented that offer improved key rates.
We term these protocols photon key distribution (PKD) to differentiate them from the standard
QKD protocols. We identify three types of photon sources and calculate asymptotic secret key
rates for PKD protocols and compare them to their QKD counterparts. Results show that PKD
protocols have roughly a factor of two higher rates as only one measurement basis is used and due to
the relaxed security assumptions can establish keys at very high losses whereas in QKD the privacy
amplification process becomes prohibitive.
Key words: quantum communication; quantum cryptography; quantum key distribution; satellite
QKD; access control; threat model; photon key distribution; PKD
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic key distribution is a major application
of quantum communication. Such schemes typically use
measurements of quantum states of photons shared be-
tween two remote parties to allow both sides to derive
shared entropy that can be quantitatively assessed to be
private. This shared entropy may be used as keying ma-
terial for use as one time pads [1] or as seed keys for
symmetric encryption [2]. Quantum Key Distribution
relies on transmission of single photons so many pho-
tons must be distributed to generate a key over lossy
channels. For shorter distances and metropolitan regions
photons can be distributed between parties using opti-
cal fibres, but for global distances satellite-based nodes
become more practical [3]. For quantum communication
from satellites, and other moving platforms, photons are
distributed using free space optics (FSO).
Quantum key distribution schemes [4, 5] have ex-
tremely strong security guarantees due to minimal as-
sumptions on the capabilities of the technology available
to potential eavesdroppers—essentially any attack per-
mitted by the laws of physics is deemed possible. Al-
though typically the two communicating parties must
trust the QKD hardware within their control, they need
not trust the optical channel between them because they
can detect any attempt at eavesdropping and any man-in-
the-middle attacks on the channel using statistical tests
that are inherent to the QKD process. These tests re-
quire a fraction of the received photons to be discarded
such that they cannot be used in the final keying ma-
terial. This discarding arises in processes such as basis
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reconciliation, parameter estimation and privacy ampli-
fication. In many situations these discarded photons and
slower key rates are a necessity for security e.g. in a
metropolitan environment where QKD is performed over
optical fibres which pass through many ducts and under-
ground passages where, in principle, eavesdropping can
take place.
For the case of satellite QKD (and other FSO deliv-
ery methods), where there is a direct line of sight, these
measures seem to be harder to justify. To compromise
the security of the link, other than disrupting it through
denial-of-service attacks, an adversary would have to act
as a man-in-the-middle. We argue that performing this
attack for an optical link between a low earth orbit (LEO)
satellite and ground station would be physically possible,
but technically not feasible for most adversaries. It re-
quires intercepting and re-sending a beam that is only
a few metres across and rapidly tracking across the sky
without being detected. Practical satellite-ground links
employ dual tracking beacons to establish the required
high accuracy pointing link, effectively providing a chan-
nel monitoring system. Additional hardware may be de-
ployed to monitor the channel in other wavelengths, e.g.
radar systems or thermal imaging cameras. Furthermore,
space situational awareness has led to publicly accessible
catalogues that provide ephemeris data of orbiting space
objects which are frequently updated, making it possible
to assess if any (publicly known) satellites can threaten
the link in space. If users fear that their adversaries could
have technologies which can covertly intercept the link
they could of course use QKD; other users can relax their
threat assumptions. In light of the above we thus focus
only on passive eavesdroppers, attackers which cannot be
detected by channel monitoring techniques. As we will
show, using this updated threat model simplifies the key
delivery protocol.
In this paper we term the simplified quantum com-
munication schemes that address this scenario as ‘pho-
ton key distribution’ (PKD) so as to separate them from
conventional QKD protocols. Some more recent QKD
schemes, where the security proofs may not yet be com-
pletely agreed, may also prove to be somewhere on the
PKD to QKD spectrum depending on the security as-
sumptions they require. While most QKD schemes use
two bases for encoding, in our PKD schemes only a sin-
gle encoding basis is used since mixed bases are primarily
a mechanism to detect man-in-the-middle attacks. This
avoids the basis reconciliation sifting stage and so is more
efficient in its use of photons.
Sasaki et al. have previously discussed the opportu-
nity for simplified cryptography schemes that fall be-
tween QKD and laser communications [6]. As they ex-
plain QKD (and PKD) fit within the wider field of phys-
ical layer security methods. These encompass such tech-
niques as wiretap channels [7] and radio frequency equiv-
alents [8], to laser-based methods that actively quantify
the amount of information an eavesdropper can receive
[9]. Our exploration of PKD here builds on the ideas put
forward by Sasaki et al.
In this paper we look at the asymptotic secret key
rates at high losses (i.e long distance free space links) for
three QKD schemes using three different kinds of trans-
mitter hardware, and compare this to three simplified
PKD schemes that use similar hardware. The simplified
schemes are primarily targeted at satellite applications
and all assume that a covert man-in-the-middle attack
has been assessed to be non-existent. As expected, they
are all found to remain effective at higher losses than
their QKD counterparts.
II. RESULTS
Table 1 shows a summary of the hardware types and
corresponding QKD and PKD methods considered. Fig-
ure 1 shows a comparison of the quantum bit error rate
(QBER) and bits per pulse achieved with these methods
at increasing distances (losses). In this way the results
can be presented independently of the pulse rate of any
particular hardware setup. Although we use the term
’pulse’ here for straightforwardness of comparison, the
SPDC sources we consider are operated by a continuous-
wave pump, i.e. not pulsed, and produce photon pairs on
a stochastic basis so ‘detection events’ would be the more
appropriate term. Figures 1 (a) and (b) show that for
QKD protocols (BB84, BBM92) there is a sharp drop off
in key rate as losses increase. At high losses more key has
to be discarded in privacy amplification than is available
so the secure key rate drops to zero. This does not hap-
pen in the PKD equivalents as it is assumed that there
are no active man-in-the-middle attacks, and so privacy
amplification is only required for multi-photon pulses.
III. DISCUSSION
The results are discussed in the sections below based
on the different hardware types. General assumptions
are that space-based detectors have 15,000 dark counts
per second while ground-based detectors have 2,500 dark
counts per second. This is based on pessimistic cases for
single photon detectors before and after radiation dam-
age [10]. Furthermore, ground-based detectors are as-
sumed to have an additional 1,000 background counts per
second due to scattered light entering the receiver. This
is slightly more conservative than noise counts estimated
in recent literature [11]. All sources are assumed to have
perfect visibility, e.g. for a SPDC source this means it is
assumed to produce perfectly entangled states.
A. Weak Coherent Pulse (WCP) source
Satellite-to-ground decoy state QKD using a Weak Co-
herent Pulse (WCP) source has conclusively been demon-
strated on the Micius satellite in 2016 [12] and the QUBE
mission aims to demonstrate a WCP QKD system on a
nanosatellite [13]. WCP sources are highly attenuated
lasers which approximate a single photon state although
multi-photon emissions are possible. We use the Mi-
cius source parameters as a realistic assumption in our
model; on average our source emits 0.8 photons per pulse.
For QKD it performs the decoy state BB84 protocol [14]
where it also emits decoy states of mean photon number
0.1, and operates at a ratio of 0.5: 0.25: 0.25 for signal,
decoy and vacuum states.
For WCP PKD no decoy states are transmitted, only
signal states with an optimised mean photon number of
between 0.4701 and 0.4583 for losses of 20-70dB. These
are assumed to be coupled to a modulator that enables
pulse position modulation (PPM) to encode bits as early
(bit 0) or late pulses (bit 1). Compared to polarisation
encoding this also removes the requirement to synchro-
nise polarisation reference frames which is especially con-
venient for then communicating to satellites.
B. Spontaneous parametric down conversion
(SPDC) photon pair source
For the QKD protocols considered here the SPDC pho-
ton pair source is assumed to be an entangled photon
pair source performing the BBM92 protocol [15, 16]. The
Micius satellite demonstrated an entangled photon pair
source in orbit [17, 18] and the SpooQy-1 nanosatellite
will demonstrate a miniaturised device in orbit in 2019
[19]. The PKD protocols with this setup can use the
same hardware or a simpler correlated (heralded) pho-
ton pair source, with unit visibility, such as the minia-
turised device flown on the Galassia nanosatellite [20]. To
avoid synchronising reference frames the two-state encod-
ing could be in left and right hand circular polarisation.
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TABLE I. QKD and PKD methods modelled for different hardware implementations.
Photon Source QKD protocol PKD encoding (example)
Weak coherent pulse (WCP) Decoy state BB84 Pulse position modulation (PPM)
Spontaneous parametric
downconversion (SPDC) pairs
BBM92
(entanglement-based BB84)
Heralded left or right-handed
polarised photons
Ideal single photon source (SPS) Single photon BB84
Left or right-handed
polarised photons
Protocols using pair sources require two detections i.e.
one of the pair must be detected at the source and the
other of the pair detected at the receiver. The total de-
tection efficiency at the source is assumed to be 25% (i.e.
there is a system loss of -6dB). The main effect of this
approach is that the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER)
partly becomes a function of the accidental rate of co-
incident detection between the two detectors. This acci-
dentals rate is given by S1×S2×τ [21, 22], where S1 and
S2 are the singles rates observed at the detectors, and τ
the timing coincidence window.
In this study, we assume that the source is capable of
producing photon pairs at a raw rate of 1×108 per second
into a single spatial mode, and that the timing resolution
is 1ns, which are readily accessible [23]. This leads to a
QBER that is between 3% and 4%; this QBER has a
linear relationship with the timing window - faster elec-
tronics will lead to smaller QBER. An advantage of using
photon pairs is that the probability of multi-photon emis-
sion is insignificant (similar to single photon sources),
leading to a smaller percentage of the raw key being dis-
carded in privacy amplification.
C. Single photon source (SPS)
The SPS is assumed to be a perfect device that pro-
duces single photons on demand and never multi-photon
pulses. For QKD this means it can perform the BB84
[24] protocol without any requirement for decoy states.
For PKD it can even be encoded in wavelength giving a
broad scope for multiplexing. In both cases the SPS has
the highest rates. It should be noted that compared to
the other technologies SPS devices are currently at low
‘technology readiness levels’ [25] or only work at cryo-
genic temperatures which means they are not a practical
choice for deployment in space.
D. Summary
The PKD protocols have higher rates than the QKD
protocols because eavesdroppers have no access to the
channel and only ‘collective attacks’ are allowed. That
means if there are no multi-photon emissions (i.e. not
using the WCP source) no privacy amplification is re-
quired. PPM PKD suffers from multi-photon emissions
so requires privacy amplification. In general the relaxed
security assumptions increase key rates and allow for key
generation at larger distances. Comparing between dif-
ferent hardware methods of PKD (or between different
hardware methods of QKD) is less conclusive, since the
‘pulse’ rates of different implementations of the hardware
will vary.
IV. MATERIALS AND METHODS
The decoy state BB84 equations used are those pub-
lished in reference [14], and the BBM92 equations are
those from reference [26].
The equation for PPM PKD is derived from the
Devetak-Winter bound for collective attack for a simpli-
fied COW PPM scheme with decoys from appendix B of
reference [27]. All parts due to decoy are set to neutral,
and an error correction term is added to the equation.
The final key rate is thus
R(µopt) = g(ζ)×
t
(1− t)
×η×(1−H2(QBER)×fE)×fsource
(1)
where g(ζ) is a privacy amplification term correspond-
ing to the optimised mean photon number µopt =
ζ
1−t
. η
is the detection efficiency, fsource is the source frequency
and t is the transmissivity.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The approach presented in this paper can be applied
to key distribution, not only when using satellites, but
also in other types of FSO-based systems. For example,
in ad-hoc networks where the transmitter and receiver
can visually identify each other, it may be straightfor-
ward to assess the absence of a man-in-the-middle and
3
20 30 40 50 60
Loss [dB]
10-10
10-5
Ke
y 
ra
te
[bi
ts/
pu
lse
]
2 Decoy state BB84
BBM92
Ideal SPS BB84
(a)
20 30 40 50 60
Loss [dB]
10-10
10-5
Ke
y 
ra
te
 [b
its
/pu
lse
]
PPM PKD
Heralded PKD
Ideal SPS PKD
(b)
20 30 40 50 60
Loss [dB]
10-2
10-1
100
101
102
QB
ER
 [%
]
2 Decoy state BB84
BBM92
Ideal SPS BB84
(c)
20 30 40 50 60
Loss [dB]
10-2
10-1
100
101
102
QB
ER
 [%
]
PPM PKD
Heralded PKD
Ideal SPS
(d)
FIG. 1. Results of modelling the schemes described in Table 1.
(a) Key generation rate for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols: Decoy State BB84, BBM92, and BB84 using an ideal
Single Photon Source (SPS).
(b) Key generation rate for photon key distribution (PKD) schemes: Pulse-position modulated (PPM) Photon Key Distribution
(PKD), PKD with a heralded photon source, and PKD using an ideal SPS.
(c) Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) for QKD protocols.
(d) QBER for simplified PKD schemes.
use PKD type protocols to establish a secret key. If the
possibility of man-in-the-middle attacks can be excluded
or monitored by conventional means, then PKD proto-
cols can allow for secure key distribution using quantum
communication methods at increased losses using similar
or simplified hardware. In a practical key distribution
scenario, it is worthwhile to have a better specification of
the threat model and to devote efforts in closing physi-
cal side-channels, rather than attempting to defeat a hy-
pothetical quantum adversary. Finally, we remark that
using QKD hardware it may be possible to switch to a
PKD protocol when the channel is assessed to be free of
active attacks, and thus increase key distribution rates.
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FSO Free Space Optics
PKD Photon Key Distribution
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